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Abstract   
Features of rational decision making (such as agenda entrance criteria and 
statement of jurisdiction) barely conceal the complexity of international 
accounting standard setting. In 2003, when the international financial reporting 
standard for small and medium-sized entities (IFRS for SMEs) project 
achieved agenda entrance, the International Accounting Standards Board’s 
(IASB) jurisdiction was to develop, ‘a single set of … accounting standards … 
to help participants in the world’s capital markets’. Drawing on interviewees’ 
recollections and other material, this study of how the project achieved agenda 
entrance finds within-IASB opposition to the project, arguing it was outside the 
IASB’s jurisdiction that dissolved with the realisation that the IASB’s 
jurisdiction would be changed to encompass the project.  
Earlier accounting works have shown that an understanding of agenda entrance 
is critical to understanding the accounting standard setting process. Consider 
Walker and Robinson (1993; 1994) and Ryan (1998). Kingdon’s (2011) model 
of agenda entrance helps to show the complexity of the politics and decision 
making messiness that resulted in a standard setting project for simplified IFRS 
but titled IFRS for SMEs. The complexity was particularly associated with: (i) 
the broader international regulatory context requiring adaptation; (ii) the 
limitations of ostensibly technical barriers to agenda entrance, including the 
boundary of the IASB’s standard-setting jurisdiction; (iii) jurisdictional 
competition; and (iv) sensitivities over the language such that the IASB could 
not agree on a suitably descriptive title. The paper responds to calls for 
attention to actions of individual board members and staff (Walker and 
Robinson, 1993; Howieson, 2009).  
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Accounting standard setting at national levels has long been known as 
complex, being interrelated with other events, and politicized (Solomons, 1983; 
Walker and Robinson, 1993 and 1994; Young, 1994; Zeff, 2002). This complexity is 
magnified at the international level where accounting standard setters must also cope 
with many countries at different stages of capital market development and different 
business cultures (Howieson, 2009; Camfferman and Zeff, 2015). Adding to that are 
the International Accounting Standards Board’s (IASB) alliances on accounting 
matters with other international bodies, such as the 1995 agreement with the 
International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) to focus international 
accounting standards on financial reporting for investors in capital markets (Klumpes, 
1994; Walker and Robinson, 1994; Young, 1994; Johnson and Swieringa, 1996; 
Ryan, 1998; Jones et al., 2004; Howieson, 2009; Crawford et al., 2014). In such an 
environment, there is a need for accounting standard setting to adapt to changing 
circumstances (Whittington, 2015), and ostensibly technical boundaries such as a 
tightly specified jurisdiction and/or agenda entrance criteria may become barriers to 
adaptation. 
This study reviews the emergence of the IASB’s International Financial 
Reporting Standard for Small and Medium sized Entities (IFRS for SMEs) project 
onto the IASB’s standard setting agenda in 2003. The project title implied a departure 
from the IASB’s constitutional focus on capital market participants, thus prompting 
the question how it achieved agenda entrance. A combination of factors, rather than 
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any single factor, is likely to generate a ‘climate of receptivity’ for entrance onto the 
accounting standard setting agenda (Walker and Robinson, 1994; Ryan, 1998). 
Among those factors are decisions about the nature and scope of a problem, the 
language in which it is formulated, and how to resolve it (Klumpes, 1994; Walker and 
Robinson, 1994; Young, 1994; Johnson and Swieringa, 1996; Ryan, 1998; Jones et 
al., 2004; Howieson, 2009). Agenda entrance decisions involve the actions of 
individual board members and staff, and yet these have received little research 
attention (Walker and Robinson, 1993; Howieson, 2009). This research reveals the 
power and influence wielded by key board members to overcome within-IASB 
opposition to the project and secure its agenda entrance. Additionally, it demonstrates 
the differences in power between key board members who wanted the SME project on 
the IASB’s standard setting agenda, and technical staff who held reservations about 
that.  
At the centre of the politics surrounding agenda entrance for cash flow 
reporting in Australia, Walker and Robinson (1994) reported conflict among 
regulators for jurisdiction and support, and recommended research attention to the 
way jurisdiction is defined, as well as to the interactions between different regulatory 
agencies. Similar to Walker and Robinson, the present study finds evidence of conflict 
over jurisdiction, in particular, over whether the IASB should ‘seize or cede’ the 
accounting standard-setting role for entities that do not issue debt or equity 
instruments for trading in public capital markets (World Standard Setters, 2003). 
However, the jurisdictional competition may have seemed greater than it really was, 
helping to subdue within-IASB conflict over the IASB’s jurisdiction and thus to 
accelerate the agenda entrance decision and extend its jurisdiction.  
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The complexity of any international standardization exercise that detaches 
‘accounting standardization from existing national traditions’, but must also allow for 
local variations, has posed particular problems for the IASB (Botzem, 2012, p.5).  
This is so here as the board was trying to counter the tendency of some companies to 
claim compliance with international standards while applying them only selectively, 
that practice having become known as applying IAS lite (Cairns, 2001; Botzem, 
2012). Especially illustrated is the importance of language in standard setting (Walker 
and Robinson, 1994; Howieson, 2009; Kingdon, 2011). This study shows that the 
SME language used focused attention on an agreed position that SMEs should not be 
required to apply the full IASB standards, while deflecting it from the IASB’s known 
inability to devise a size-based definition of an SME for international application. The 
implications of a project to produce a simplified version of the IASB’s standards for 
wider application received little attention.  
This study draws on Kingdon’s (2011) model of agenda setting to understand 
how the SME project achieved agenda entrance. According to Kingdon, a single 
influencing factor is an unlikely trigger for agenda entrance; rather ‘a complex of 
factors’ is more likely to be involved (Kingdon, 2011 p.49).  
AGENDA SETTING 
Kingdon compares agenda setting to organized anarchy, arguing that rational 
process models of policy making do not ‘very accurately describe reality’ (p.79).  He 
draws on the US Presidential system of government to explain his model which, 
although developed in the US political context, is now used increasingly outside the 
US (Eissler et al., 2014), and in the context of international regulatory regimes (see, 
for example, studies of policy making in the EU, such as Zahariadis, 2008; Ackrill 
and Kay, 2011; Alexandrova et al., 2012; Bache, 2013; Palmer, 2015). While other 
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models such as Cobb and Elder’s (1972), and Mitnick’s (1980) have proved useful in 
studies of accounting standard-setting, they pay relatively less attention than Kingdon 
to agenda entrance and are less suitable here. Kingdon’s model has been used in 
accounting studies (see for example, Ryan, 1998), and more importantly proved 
useful in other complex environments where multiple problem formulations and 
potential policy solutions may exist (Morris, 1999; Ackrill et al., 2013). The IASB 
exists in such an environment, having emerged as part of the international regime 
regulating global financial markets, and yet the extension of its jurisdiction beyond 
those financial markets to accommodate the SME project means the IASB arguably 
now claims ‘to represent the general logic of globalized capitalism’ (Botzem, 2012, 
p.179).  
According to Kingdon, agenda setting in an organized anarchy involves 
organized patterns and structures. Elected officials, especially those at high levels, 
hold the formal authority and institutional resources to make appointments to policy 
positions, to establish a tone, and to decide some key issues when setting the agenda. 
But this organizational authority is tempered by the influence of other participants in 
the process (both internal and external) who engage in more detail and consequently 
tend to have greater effect on policy alternatives and implementation.  
Recognizing that many people may participate in agenda-related activities, 
Kingdon identifies two general groupings, those who are visible and those who are 
relatively hidden. He proposes the agenda is typically most affected by visible 
participants, those who tend to receive ‘press and public attention’ such as those 
holding high level appointments (Kindgon, 2011, p.68). The relatively hidden 
participants, such as staff and researchers, are more likely to generate policy 
alternatives than to determine what is on the agenda. Interest groups range between 
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visible and relatively hidden groups; further, some interest group activities may be 
conducted publicly and others relatively invisibly.  
In the case of the IASB, board members may be characterized as visible 
participants with the chairman the most visible and organizationally powerful. The 
first chairman of the IASB, Sir David Tweedie, was also its chief executive, holding a 
level of power and resources Kingdon regards as presidential. Staff members may be 
identified, but they tend to be relatively hidden, their technical role implying a greater 
influence in proposing policy alternatives and implementation than in setting the 
agenda. At this international level the most visible interest groups include alliance 
partner organisations, such as the World Bank and IOSCO, while the less visible 
groups are some of those associated with particular policy interests.  
Kingdon (pp.3-4) distinguishes between a broad concept of an agenda as a list 
of topics receiving ‘serious attention at any given time’, and the decision agenda as 
the list of items ‘that are up for an active decision.’ As will become apparent, the 
SME project was on the IASB’s broader technical agenda from the time of its 
establishment. The focus here is on how that project entered the IASB’s decision 
agenda, that is, its standard setting agenda.   
To conceptualize the agenda-setting process, Kingdon identifies three 
concurrent streams of activity (‘problem’, ‘policy’ and ‘politics’). Each stream has its 
own origins and dynamics, and flows relatively independently of the others, while 
interaction between them sets the boundaries for policy debate and potential policy 
solutions.  No stream has sufficient force on its own for an item to achieve agenda 
entrance or remain there, that outcome becoming more likely when the streams 
converge. Accordingly, agenda entrance is unlikely to result from a single factor, but 
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rather from ‘the joint effect of several factors coming together at a given point in 
time’ (p.179).  
The problem stream involves formulating a particular condition as a problem 
in need of a policy response (Kingdon, 2011). How a problem is formulated and 
categorized structures perceptions of it, so language and persuasiveness are important 
considerations. Indeed, a new category of problem may prompt ‘entirely new 
definitions of problems and conceptualizations of solutions’ (Kingdon 2011, p.111).   
Problem formulation determines, inter alia, whether a problem falls within a 
policy maker’s jurisdiction, the problem’s suitability for the policy maker’s 
capabilities, and its likely effect on the budget. How a problem is formulated will 
benefit some parties at the expense of others, and affects a policy maker’s willingness 
to accept it as an agenda item. The chances of even quite a pressing problem 
achieving agenda entrance are low in the absence of other factors, but may be 
‘dramatically increased’ if that problem is linked with a policy proposal (p.142).  
Policy proposals are developed in the policy stream of agenda-setting activity, 
where multiple policy communities with varying levels of power, authority, visibility 
and capacity interact (Robinson, 2000; Kingdon, 2011). These policy proposals may 
emerge to solve a known policy problem, or they may emerge for other reasons, such 
as to suit particular interests (Kingdon, 2011).  
Within any policy community, policy proposal development occurs within 
limits, compatibility with the values of the policy community members being 
important if the proposal is to receive serious consideration. Obvious practical limits 
include feasibility and constrained resources. However, a policy proposal also needs 
to win political approval and wider public acceptance for it to proceed further. 
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In some policy communities, policy entrepreneurs, people with some claim to 
be heard such as leadership of a professional or particular interest group, those with 
other political connections or negotiating skills, and possibly some authoritative 
decision making power of their own, will try to win the necessary political approval 
and public acceptance. In doing so, a policy entrepreneur may function as both policy 
broker and policy advocate. As broker, a policy entrepreneur may bend a particular 
problem to suit that entrepreneur’s policy proposal, and is assisted in any negotiations 
by some vagueness in the policy proposal. As advocate, a policy entrepreneur may be 
expected to lobby and speak publicly seeking to influence the policy community 
itself, other policy communities and the relevant public (Ackrill and Kay, 2011; 
Kingdon, 2011). Thus, a policy entrepreneur’s activities help to bridge the policy 
stream where acceptance of policy proposals is built by reasoning, and the politics 
stream, where agreement to support a particular policy proposal is facilitated by 
bringing together ‘diverse interests’ and bargaining (Kingdon, 2011, p.161). 
The politics stream of activity encompasses the broader context that affects a 
policy maker’s willingness to accept a problem onto its agenda (Kingdon, 2011). 
Among the contextual influences are pressures exerted by external or internal interest 
groups, the public mood, and the policy maker’s own interests, including 
jurisdictional interests, and changing priorities and personnel (Robinson, 2000; 
Kingdon, 2011). This politics stream is an important ‘promoter or inhibiter of high 
agenda status’ (Kingdon, 2011, p.163).  
Interest group pressures and public mood influence, but do not necessarily 
determine, a policymaker’s willingness to act. Problems that are consistent with the 
public mood and/or interest group pressure may be more easily accepted for agenda 
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entrance, while those that are inconsistent may require reformulation to suit the mood, 
or be delayed until the mood changes.    
In the presence of jurisdictional competition, a problem that fits within the 
jurisdiction may be moved onto the agenda quickly (Kingdon, 2011). Jurisdictional 
competition, however, tends to reinforce other influences rather than to determine 
agenda entrance: ‘If the complex of political and policy forces are already balanced 
against an issue, competition for [jurisdictional] turf will drive the last nail into the 
coffin. But if that same balance tilts toward the issue, competition will contribute its 
share to moving the issue along’ (p.158).  
Finally, changes in the policy maker’s own interests, priorities and personnel 
affect what may be considered for agenda entrance. For example, those in positions of 
authority may hold their own views about agenda entrance priorities, and will 
themselves eventually change, with a resulting effect on the agenda.  
Opportunities for agenda entrance, known as a policy window, are brief and 
limited, an already full agenda and budget constraints imposing obvious limitations. 
Occasionally, the timing of such an opportunity will be predictable, such as when 
agenda items are being ordered and re-ordered. Similarly predictable are some events 
in the politics stream, such as a scheduled change of key personnel that may lead to 
openings for problem and policy ideas. At other times an opportunity may occur with 
little warning, perhaps because a problem has become pressing or has caught 
officials’ attention. That may in turn prompt a search of the policy stream for a policy 
proposal, preferably already considered acceptable, ‘that can reasonably be seen as a 
solution’ (p.174). 
When a policy window opens, various policy advocates may be expected to 
use the opportunity to promote their proposal. Because various loose couplings of 
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problem formulation and policy solution are possible, a policy advocate may attach a 
proposal to a problem that suits the politics of the time and ‘enlist political allies’ to 
support it (p. 182). Especially when the intent behind that proposal does not provide 
an acceptable reason for change on its own, coupling it with a different problem may 
help to provide cover. Consequently, a policy proposal may easily become attached to 
a problem that ‘did not necessarily dictate’ that as the solution (p.177). This can mean 
that those with power over decisions to open a policy window risk a policy outcome 
that is ‘worse than the status quo’, while those opposed to a particular policy proposal 
may try to force delays hoping for the window to close in the meantime (p.175). 
According to Kingdon, when agenda entrance occurs, the critical event to 
understand is how the three streams of agenda-setting activity come together, and 
often just one or a few people will be central to that. However, he warned that the 
impact on the agenda differs ‘from control over the alternatives or over the outcomes’ 
(p.164). After an item has achieved agenda entrance and ‘organized forces enter the 
picture, trying as best they can to bend the outcomes to their advantage’, the outcome 
of the project will ‘depend on the mix of elements present and how the various 
elements are coupled’ (pp.163, 166).   
RESEARCH METHOD 
Events and related documents concurrent with the establishment of the IASB 
in early 2001, and through to September 2003, shortly after the SME project was 
placed on the IASB’s active standard-setting agenda are reviewed. The IASB did not, 
initially, have documented agenda setting procedures, and such documentation did not 
emerge until 2006 (Howieson, 2009). By 2003, the IASB did provide some vague 
description on its website about how it made its agenda setting decisions, but that 
description was ‘silent on the process and criteria used by IASB members to formally 
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admit projects to the technical agenda once potential projects had been identified’ 
(Howieson, 2009, p. 592)1. There is, therefore, no published formal due process 
against which to assess the IASB’s decision on this project. We draw upon Kingdon’s 
(2011) model of agenda-setting activities to understand how the project achieved 
entrance onto the IASB’s standard-setting agenda.   
The pre-agenda entrance stage of accounting standard setting has received 
scant research attention and insights obtained contribute to our knowledge of this 
period (Walker and Robinson, 1994; Howieson, 2009). Both documentary analysis 
and interviews are drawn upon.2 Interviews provide the prospect for gaining insight 
into events that might not have been documented. However, interviewees may: have 
limited knowledge or recollection, provide a biased account of events, or withhold 
information (Richards, 1996). The 16 interviewees were IASB members involved in, 
or observers of, the development of the IFRS for SMEs standard.  Some held multiple 
roles (see Table 1). They include both supporters and opponents of the project. All 
                                                 
1 The relevant text of that 2003 description as reproduced by Howieson (2009, p.591), was: 
‘How does the IASB decide what subjects to add to its agenda? Board Members, members 
of the Standards Advisory Council, National Standard Setters, securities regulators, other 
organizations and individuals and the IASB staff are encouraged to submit suggestions for 
new topics which might be dealt with in their accounting standards.  
The International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), which represents 
securities market regulators around the world, completed a review of IASC Standards in 
2000, and their Report contained several areas where their members would like to see 
improvements in IAS. The IASB Staff are working with IOSCO to determine priorities.’ 
2 Published documents include those available from the IASB’s website: IASB project 
updates, reports of IASB meetings and of the IASB’s Standards Advisory Council 
meetings; and initial consultation documents issued as the public due process 
commenced for the SMEs project. Unpublished material includes International 
Standard-setting Reports (IStaR) which provide more details about IASB meetings than 
the IASB’s own reports, and internal IASB material presented to the September 2003 
meeting of World Standard-setters. Additional published documentary material comes 
from the World Bank, and from the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development’s (UNCTAD) group of experts on International Standards of Accounting 
and Reporting (ISAR). While the group is known as ISAR, the published material is 
issued by UNCTAD and is listed as such in the references list. 
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interviewees signed an ethics-approved participant consent form in which they agreed 
they could be identified, and that they would have the opportunity to review and 
correct the interview transcript and to identify any information they did not want 
cited. Fifteen interviews were conducted in 2008, and a further one in November 2011 
to clarify matters that emerged in the process of analysing the data. Most interviews 
were conducted in person in November 2008, although four were telephone 
interviews (those with Thomas Jones, Nelson Carvhallo, Peter Walton, and Geoffrey 
Whittington).  The interviews ranged from 15 minutes to one hour, and the questions 
were open-ended, relating to the particular aspects of the SME project with which the 
interviewee was familiar. All interviews were recorded, transcribed and forwarded to 
the interviewees to review and identify any information they wished not to be cited. 
No interviewee asked for any material to be removed or not cited.   
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Within the IASB, the project was known as the SME project even though the 
title was known to be not necessarily appropriate. For simplicity, that term for the 
project is also used here. An outline of the relevant events before the IASB’s 
establishment, and some initial pressures on its standard setting agenda provides 
context for examining agenda entrance of the SME project.   
THE IASB AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF IFRS FOR SMES 
Context prior to establishment of IASB  
For nearly two decades prior to 1995 when the IASB’s predecessor, the 
International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) narrowed its standard setting 
focus to investors in capital markets, there were warning signs in both developed and 
lesser developed countries that application to all entities would be unworkable. In 
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developed countries, where standard-setters had already prioritized capital market 
participants, the standards had been criticized as too difficult to apply, producing 
overly complex information often beyond the decision making needs of the users of 
financial statements of smaller companies, and as imposing excessive compliance 
costs (see for example, Hepp and McRae, 1982; Carsberg et al., 1985). The 
differential reporting regimes devised in response to such complaints allowed 
departures ‘from some particular requirements of accounting standards or the entire 
accounting standards’ (Hepp and McRae, 1982; Abdel Khalik, 1983; Carsberg et al., 
1985; Harvey and Walton, 1996; CAPA 2003, p.7).3 Standard-setters paid little 
attention to user needs when providing differential reporting concessions, seeking 
instead to reduce compliance costs (Jarvis, 1996). 
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) had 
established a working group of experts on International Standards of Accounting and 
Reporting (ISAR). Once perceived as a rival of the IASC, ISAR championed the 
financial reporting interests of lesser developed countries (Martinez-Diaz, 2005). The 
IASC had long promoted its standards to lesser developed countries as a lower cost 
alternative to maintaining their own standard-setting infrastructures. Many lesser 
developed countries adopted these standards under the influence of such international 
bodies as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Hove, 1986; 
Perera, 1989; Camfferman and Zeff, 2006). Among the many long-standing concerns 
about the appropriateness of these standards for application in lesser developed 
countries, were the capacity to cope with the requirements, and the information needs 
                                                 
3 Typically, those companies that qualified for differential reporting were those that did not 
have securities on issue, or were deemed not to have external users reliant on published 
financial reports, and/or were categorised small as determined by size criteria involving 
some combination of balance sheet assets, turnover, and number of staff (CAPA, 2003).  
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of the main users of these financial statements (Briston, 1978; Hove, 1986; Wallace 
and Briston, 1993; Hassan, 1998).  
The IASC’s standards allowed several optional treatments and, for a time 
(from the late 1980s until 1995) the IASC acknowledged ‘financial reporting needs’ 
in lesser developed countries, but rejected the idea of separate standards for them 
(Hassan, 1998; interviews with Nobes and Walton). From the mid-1990s, as the IASC 
strived for IOSCO acceptance of its standards in capital markets world-wide, its 
accounting standards became increasingly complicated and less flexible as optional 
treatments were removed under the general goal of ‘narrowing areas of difference’ 
(Hassan, 1998; Gornik-Tomaszewski, 2005; Crawford et al., 2014). A potential 
source of embarrassment was that some listed companies claiming compliance were 
found not to comply fully with them, this selective compliance being described as 
‘IAS lite’ (Cairns, 2001; interviews with Jarvis and Walton). ‘The IASB and the 
IASC before it … struggled … to pull back from’ this by amending IAS 1 
Presentation of Financial Statements so that preparers ‘either apply everything or you 
can’t call it IAS ... it’s got to be the full thing’ (interview with Walton).  
The IASC was ‘running flat out to try to satisfy IOSCO and really nothing else 
would have been allowed to get in the way’ (interview with Nobes). Lesser developed 
countries were caught between the international bodies’ power to impose the IASC’s 
standards on them and the IASC’s desire for IOSCO approval (Cairns, 1997). Some 
countries that had adopted IAS were left ‘feeling a bit disenfranchised from the 
products that were coming out which were increasingly focused on listed companies’ 
(interview with Martin). 
In 2000, with the IASB’s emergence imminent, the IASC again rejected 
separate standards for entities operating in lesser developed countries (Fleming, 
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2000). Recognising the IASB would have other priorities, ISAR’s Lorraine Ruffing 
commissioned research that reformulated the problem by shifting the focus to SMEs 
(interview with Martin; Jarvis et al., 2008). 
ISAR argued that accounting and financial reporting regulations are seldom 
designed specifically for SMEs, and financial reports that comply with existing 
accounting standards are of little use to them. Many SMEs lacked the skilled 
accounting personnel and infrastructure needed to implement the international 
standards, and they sought low-cost, understandable accounting and management 
guidance.  Arguing that, ‘reducing disclosure requirements from IAS is just not a 
sufficient solution in a developing economy’, ISAR proposed a three-tiered financial 
reporting framework (UNCTAD, 2000, p. 20). This would ‘provide a nested set of 
rules whereby, as the business grew, it would progress up a ladder of accounting 
evolution, starting with cash-basis accounts and then moving to simple accruals and 
ultimately to full IAS’ (UNCTAD, 2000, p.20; interview with Fleming).  
When the problem as experienced in lesser developed countries 
‘metamorphosed into the small and medium enterprises, ... [it] got support from ... 
members of more developed countries ... [and] the two expectations got moved into 
the SME project’ (interview with Sullivan). The IASC’s December 2000 handover 
document to the IASB acknowledged that calls for attention to small businesses were 
not confined to lesser developed countries, and proposed that small business preparers 
of financial reports were ‘becoming interested’ in using international standards ‘to 
achieve comparability with larger businesses’ (IASC, 2000, para 29).  
IASB: pressures on the standard setting agenda 
In early 2001, as the IASB commenced discussion of its technical agenda the 
European Commission announced that the consolidated financial reports of listed 
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companies in EU countries must comply with IFRS from 2005 (Botzem, 2012).4 
Australia followed with a requirement for adoption from 2005 that was not limited to 
consolidated financial reports. This put the IASB under pressure to achieve a ‘stable 
platform’ of standards in time for the adoption dates. 
The EU regulation also allowed member states to extend the requirement to 
comply with the IASB’s standards to entities other than listed companies (Botzem, 
2012). Consequently, an added pressure on the IASB came from ‘some parties within 
Europe ... [who sought] ... a common framework for non-listed entities’ (Walton, 
2001, p.12; interviews with Sullivan and Walton).  
The IASB realized that applying its standards ‘across the board’ would cause 
difficulties, but was reminded that the phrasing of its constitution had been ‘fought 
over word by word’: the constitution required the IASB to ‘address the needs of the 
international capital markets and it should concern itself exclusively with that’ 
(Walton, 2001, p.12).5 On its technical agenda, the IASB listed ‘Accounting by Small 
and Medium-Sized Entities and in Emerging Economies’ as a research topic, 
delegating it to other national accounting standard-setters to determine ‘whether there 
is a need for special guidance to clarify financial requirements in the context of 
financial reports’ (IASB, 2001, p.8). Comments of interviewees support this: 
The differential reporting side of things was parked [as] ‘not now, maybe later, 
we’re not sure whether we’re the right people to do this, and certainly we don’t 
have the time now.’ (Interview with Fleming).  
                                                 
4 During the 1990s, the EC had supported the IASC’s efforts to gain IOSCO acceptance for its 
standards (Gornik-Tomaszewski, 2005; Botzem, 2012; Crawford et al., 2014). 
5 The constitution required the IASB to: ‘develop … a single set of … accounting standards 
... to help participants in the world’s capital markets and other users make economic 
decisions; to promote the use and rigorous application of those standards; and to bring 
about convergence of national accounting standards and International Accounting 
Standards and International Financial Reporting Standards to high quality solutions’ 
(IASCF, 2005, para. 9, emphasis added). 
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 There was ... doubt about whether the board itself was competent in setting the 
sort of small company standard that some people wanted because it wasn’t a 
board comprised of people who knew about small companies ... (Interview with 
Whittington).  
While the topic title seemed to confine the scope of attention, the explanation 
identified SMEs as just one of the ‘certain types of enterprises’ to benefit from such 
guidance, another example being privately held enterprises (IASB, 2001, p.8). 
Problem stream  
In the problem stream, there was already ISAR’s reformulation of the problem for 
developing countries into a problem for SMEs. This reformulation was clearly of 
interest in Europe where opposition was building to the prospect of full international 
accounting standards for non-listed entities. Early findings from the World Bank’s 
Reporting on the Observance of Standards and Codes program suggested the full 
standards were unduly complicated for SMEs generally and for lesser developed 
countries (CAPA, 2003; World Bank, 2004; Mir and Rahaman, 2005).6 Whereas 
previously the World Bank and IMF had tried to ‘persuade countries to adopt full 
scale’ international financial reporting standards, interviewees suggested they now 
began to ‘push [for simplified standards] with rather more logic’ (interview with 
Nobes). ‘Certainly, the IMF was very keen ... In a lot of work with developing and 
                                                 
6 This program commenced in the mid-1990s, especially with comparing each country’s 
national accounting and auditing standards with the international standards, and the level 
of compliance with those standards. The countries assessed early in the program were 
Bangladesh, Bulgaria, Egypt, Jamaica, Kenya, Lithuania, Macedonia, Mauritius, 
Philippines, Poland, Romania, South Africa and Ukraine (see 
http://www.worldbank.org/ifa/rosc.html for details of each program report).   
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emerging economies we found that there were difficulties with adopting the full 
blown IFRS’ (interview with Sullivan). 
Representatives from lesser developed regions that wanted to ‘be 
international’, but lacked the infrastructure to implement the international standards 
also pressed for simplified standards (IASCF, 2002; Fleming, 2002a; b; Deloitte 
Touche Tohmatsu, 2002a; interviews with Fleming, Jarvis, Jones, and Walton).7 
However, whether simplified accounting standards alone would resolve this was 
debatable:  
there was no point in having IAS in place if you didn’t have the qualified 
accountants who were competent, who were familiar with standards’, as well as a 
supportive ‘regulatory environment’ and a ‘credible banking system.’ (Interview 
with Fleming). 
The IASB commenced ‘active research work’ on this project in 2002 by 
appointing an advisory panel to assist staff work on a detailed project proposal and 
changed the project title to ‘Accounting and Financial Reporting by SMEs and 
Emerging Economies and Transitional Economies’ (Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, 
2002b; IASCF, 2002, p.10; Camfferman and Zeff, 2015).8 Again, there was some 
ambiguity about the focus of the project. The research intention identified was 
whether the ‘burden of compliance with international accounting standards can be 
reduced for small and medium-sized entities’, without mention of emerging and 
                                                 
7 These regions included Africa, Asia and Latin America. Several interviewees mentioned one 
Standards Advisory Council member describing the difficulties in Sri Lanka complying 
with standards that required actuarial estimates. One of the two actuaries in Sri Lanka 
had died recently. 
8 The panel included ‘representatives of the national standard-setters of Canada, New Zealand 
and the United Kingdom; practitioners from Hong Kong, Sri Lanka and the Caribbean; 
representatives of central or regional governments’ multilateral lending agencies and 
others’ (IASCF, 2002, p. 10) 
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transitional economies (IASCF, 2002, p.10). ‘We didn’t distinguish [between matters 
that] were specifically related to emerging economy issues, as opposed to issues that 
... could affect SMEs around the world’ (interview with Garnett). However, the IASB 
expected the project to ‘help non-listed companies to stay within the scope of IASB 
standards by applying a cost-benefit test to their financial reporting, [and allow]... 
those seeking a public listing to make the change to IFRS without undue cost or 
effort’ (IASCF, 2002, p.10, emphasis added). This slide in language to non-listed 
companies emerged because an internationally applicable, size-based approach to 
defining SMEs was not feasible: ‘not big ... is usually done with quantitative 
thresholds and what is not big in [one country] is larger than gross domestic product 
in some [other] countries’ (interview with Fleming). But the project title retained size-
based terminology and was narrowed to ‘Financial Reporting by Small and Medium-
sized Entities’ following the advisory panel’s first meeting in April 2003.9 
Policy stream   
The IASB’s decision to omit SMEs from its standard setting agenda in 2001, 
‘gave impetus to’ ISAR’s project to develop a three-tiered financial reporting 
framework to facilitate progression to full IFRS (interview with Fleming). The IASB 
similarly sought progression, to ‘draw the companies subject to the discussion 
ultimately into IFRS’ but wanted the differences from full standards limited to 
reduced disclosure requirements while maintaining measurement and recognition 
requirements (IASCF, 2001, p.19; Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, 2002a).10 These IASB-
                                                 
9 Several board members and representatives of a US organisation of private companies also 
attended this meeting. It was apparent that interest in the problem went beyond SMEs 
(Interview with Garnett). 
10 This was at the peak of the IASB’s efforts to pursue fair value, ‘defined as a selling price’, 
in its standards (see Whittington, 2015, p.560). 
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announced constraints influenced ISAR which observed a ‘political decision’ not to 
‘deviate from the recognition and measurement rules of full IFRS’ as it developed 
guidelines for tier two of its framework, immediately below full compliance with 
IFRS (Jarvis et al., 2008, p.116). ISAR called this tier SMEGA (Accounting and 
Financial Reporting Guidelines for Small and Medium-sized Enterprises) (UNCTAD, 
2001). It was targeted to ‘significant business enterprises that do not issue public 
securities and in which there is no significant public interest’, and contained the key 
policy features the IASB sought (UNCTAD, 2004, pp. iii).11 
By 2003, besides the development of ISAR’s tier 2 guidelines, some European 
countries had reportedly begun to develop their own simplified IFRS (IStaR, 2003a).  
By the time the IASB’s advisory panel met in April 2003, an IASB policy solution 
was clearly being discussed: ‘(a) whether to add special standards for SMEs to 
existing IAS and IFRS or to publish a separate comprehensive IFRS for SMEs; (b) 
which disclosures might be simplified or eliminated for SMEs; and (c) whether 
differential recognition and measurement standards are appropriate’ (Deloitte Touche 
Tohmatsu, 2003).  
Politics stream   
When the IASB omitted the accounting needs of SMEs from its initial standard 
setting agenda in 2001, it had agreed to ‘review any proposals generated from 
outside’, and to review its decision not to act if another body produced a policy 
solution (IASCF, 2001; Walton, 2001, p.12). In its announcement that it would 
develop the three tiered reporting framework ISAR urged the IASB ‘and other 
                                                 
11 This policy response contains the same slide in language, the title SMEGA suggesting a 
size based response and the contents covering something different. 
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relevant international bodies’ to recognize, ‘that accounting by SMEs is an urgent 
issue for economic and social development for developed and developing countries 
alike’ (UNCTAD, 2001, para 9).  
When ISAR commenced work on its framework, it wanted ‘the IASB to take 
over the ISAR project’ (interview with Walton). While this did not occur, ISAR’s 
actions did ‘essentially force the lead’ on the IASB (interview with Fleming). When it 
issued its tier 2 SMEGA guideline in mid-2003, ISAR urged the IASB to prioritize its 
project on SMEs, warning that it would ‘keep the SMEGA under review in light of 
developments in the IASB’s project’ (UNCTAD, 2004, p.iv). However, as a UN 
guideline, SMEGA ‘lacked the authority’ and while some within ISAR hoped the 
IASB would endorse SMEGA, others advised the IASB to prevent it from becoming 
established by promulgating its own standard (UNCTAD, 2002; Jarvis et al., 2008, 
p.118; interviews with Carvallo, Martin and Walton). 
The IASB remained divided over admitting the SME project onto its standard-
setting agenda. Some members felt ‘responsible for the fact that many countries had 
gone ahead and adopted full IFRS’ when ‘it is crystal clear that the full standards ... 
are far too complex for small companies’ (IStaR, 2003b, p.37; interviews with Jones, 
Walton and Whittington). Against the background of the IASC’s (and now the 
IASB’s) struggle against selective application of the standards by listed companies, 
however, other board members ‘saw the SME standard as a back door to demand 
IFRS-lite’ (interview with Walton). They believed such a standard would undermine 
the quality of the IASB’s full standards (Walton, 2001; IStaR, 2003b; interviews with 
Jones, Sullivan, Walton and Whittington). ‘On the board, there was a lot of fear the 
standards would be diluted’ (interview with Whittington). 
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One argument against accepting the project, promoted ‘particularly [by] the 
North Americans’ was that the IASB’s constitution required a single set of financial 
reporting standards for capital market participants (interviews with Jones and Pacter). 
‘I thought a single set meant one ... I didn’t think a single set meant more than one’ 
(interview with Leisenring). Those board members argued that a second set of 
standards was outside the IASB’s mandate, seeing ‘their primary responsibility as 
being to the large capital markets. Others said, well the capital markets reference in 
the IASB constitution is not only public capital markets but private capital markets 
and … so you need to be a bit wider’ (interview with Fleming). Evidently, the IASCF 
Trustees did not see the constitution as such a barrier to the SME project, the 
Chairman of the IASCF making public his support for the IASB to consider SMEs 
and lesser developed countries (see IASCF, 2002). 
Pressure increased on the IASB to add the SME project to its standard setting 
agenda. Demand for the SME project had originated ‘from the developing world’ 
(interviews with Garnett and Jones), and the IASB’s standard-setting attention was 
focused on achieving its ‘stable platform’ of standards in time for the 2005 adoption 
deadlines, but the Standards Advisory Council reminded the board of its 
‘responsibilities [to] all parts of the world and not just the Anglo-Saxon parts’ 
(interview with Garnett).  Additionally, representatives from such influential bodies as 
the UN, World Bank and IMF, and EU urged the IASB to include the SME project on 
its standard setting agenda (interviews with Fleming, Garnett, Jones, Leisenring, 
Nobes, Pacter, Seidenstein, and Tweedie).  
[The IASB was] getting comments in from people like the World Bank, from 
various countries saying it’s too complicated to do IFRS. … gradually you get 
enough votes to say, yes, there is a problem; we just have to do it. (Interview 
with Tweedie). 
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No doubt there would have been support from the United Nations. … I think it is 
probably pressure from the EU that pushed it. (Interview with Nobes).  
 
I wouldn’t say that the [European] Commission stood out. But it was definitely 
supportive. (Interview with Jones).  
 
The UN and the World Bank I think essentially approached the trustees and said 
that they were unhappy with the fact that the IASB was unable to make progress 
on a standard for SMEs. (Interview with Fleming).  
Agenda Entrance  
According to Kingdon, agenda entrance typically results from several factors 
coming together at the same time, and the critical event to understand is how the 
streams of activity eventually converge. In the case of the SME project, both the 
problem and policy proposals had come together, although both were somewhat 
vague, and evidently required some of Kingdon’s (2011) ‘bending’ to bring them 
together.  
In the problem stream, ISAR had taken the lead with its formulation of the 
problem as the IASB’s standards being too difficult for SMEs and lesser developed 
countries, and the World Bank’s standards and codes program provided evidence to 
support that. Further, as the European Commission’s IFRS adoption deadline for 
listed companies loomed, the perceived problem for non-listed entities grew. Whereas 
previously, IAS-lite research findings had resulted in non-compliance with full IFRS 
being viewed as a problem requiring the standard-setter’s action to ensure full 
application (Cairns, 2001), now the existence of IFRS without any allowable 
simplification was represented as a problem. Certainly, the perceived problem related 
to a broader range of entities than SMEs.  
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In the policy stream, the IASB had signalled that acceptable proposals would 
need to start with full IFRS. By mid-2003, ISAR’s tier 2 SMEGA guideline provided 
a model policy response but, despite the SME reference in the title that was for 
significant non-listed business enterprises (UNCTAD, 2004). Additionally, some 
European countries were reportedly developing their own simplified IFRS. 
In the politics stream, there was already significant external support and a 
receptive mood for the SME project, and both the chairman of the IASCF Trustees 
and the Standards Advisory Council evidently encouraged a broader, rather than 
narrower interpretation of the IASB’s role in the international environment. ISAR’s 
project built at least the impression of jurisdictional competition and when ISAR 
issued SMEGA in 2003 this made it seem that, should the IASB not act quickly, there 
would emerge  multiple ‘adaptations of IFRS, … everything would be a mixture over 
the world …’ (IStaR 2003b; interviews with Jones, Pacter and Tweedie).  Despite all 
this support, there remained ‘sharp divisions within the IASB staff leadership and also 
within the Board’ (World Standard Setters meeting, 2003, p.5): 
[Those board members] who wanted to ... [proceed with the project] ... were 
actually very dedicated to doing it. On the other hand, the people who opposed it 
on the board … said our reason for existence is a single set of high quality 
standards and a single set isn’t two sets, one for big and one for small. So you 
can understand both points of view. (Interview with Jones). 
 
[The board] didn’t want anybody else to develop standards based on IAS/IFRS. 
But if there was going to be a cut down version, they would do it. They wouldn’t 
let anyone else do it. (Interview with Walton).  
Suggestive of Kingdon’s entrepreneur role, for agenda entrance to occur 
action was required from those with the ability and sufficient power to persuade or 
sidestep the remaining within-IASB opponents. IASB chairman Tweedie and vice 
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chairman Jones had long been convinced this project should proceed, and knew the 
IASCF trustees supported consideration of the project (see IASCF, 2002;  
Camfferman and Zeff, 2015). They approached the IASCF for further support, which 
resulted in a change in the constitution.  
What happened in the end, we went to the trustees and [reported a] dilemma — 
enough board members oppose [the project] and they could block it but most 
board members, the majority of board members feel [the IASB] should do it … 
The trustees … amended the constitution to take away that issue that only one 
single set was allowed by the constitution. So they opened the way for two or 
three of the people who had opposed the standard to say, okay, if it is within the 
constitution and the trustees agree we will support it. (Interview with Jones).  
 
Well, technically, some people could say, hey, you shouldn’t be there. We 
thought we should be there but the way our constitution was drafted, it almost 
excluded them so it was really changing it to bring them in. The same way we 
will be under pressure to deal with not-for-profit and eventually, I suspect, public 
sector but that’s not there yet either. So the constitution will eventually change to 
encompass whatever the trustees think the board should deal with. … We [the 
board] felt that there was a danger we were going outside our mandate and 
therefore, you know, people could rightly criticise, saying you’re wasting 
resources, why are you doing this? So we pretty well wanted to make clear that it 
was supported. (Interview with Tweedie). 
 
Someone said that the IASB, they put it in legal terms, doesn’t have the 
competence to do it because they felt that our constitution didn’t allow us to do 
that work. So the trustees said well we’ll just make it absolutely clear that this is 
within the scope of what the IASB could do. (Interview with Garnett). 
The IASB’s five yearly constitution review commenced in late 2003, and was 
not completed until 2005.12  However, knowledge within the IASB in mid-2003 that 
                                                 
12 The first question in the consultation document issued in 2003 was whether there should 
‘be a specific objective to address the special challenges facing small and medium-sized 
entities (SMEs)’ (IASCF, 2003, para 4). The formal amendment in 2005 required the 
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there would be a constitutional amendment to accommodate SMEs was sufficient to 
overcome most remaining arguments against agenda entrance, even if it did not 
persuade all of those opposed (interviews with Garnett, Pacter, and Tweedie). 
What that tells you is that David was going to do [the project] anyway. ... We’ll 
just change the constitution so that it is within our constitution. (Interview with 
Walton). 
 
We never sat there and said, ‘we should make this applicable’ ... because we 
don’t decide what things are applicable. Since that’s not our decision, we 
couldn’t have done that. (Interview with Leisenring). 
If changing the constitution seems an extraordinary measure to overcome 
board resistance to the project, it was not the only such measure. Some senior 
members of the IASB’s staff opposed the SME project, this being ‘a philosophical 
difference’ (interview with Fleming). Those staff ‘felt just like Jim Leisenring that 
[such a project] would damage the conceptual framework because we’d have two 
different definitions of assets’ (interview with Pacter). Sir David Tweedie was ‘not 
pleased when discovering early in 2003, that instead of presenting a detailed project 
proposal, staff intended to propose to the board not to place an SME project on the 
Board’s agenda’ and, using his power as chairman,  he ‘had the agenda paper 
retracted’ (Camfferman and Zeff,  2015, p.386, emphasis in original).  
Usually, for the IASB’s standard-setting projects the ‘two most senior 
members of the [IASB’s] technical staff’ would supervise the project manager who 
would have more than one project to manage (IASB, 2010). However, Tweedie 
established special staffing arrangements for the SME project. He recruited Paul 
                                                 
IASB to ‘take account of, as appropriate, the special needs of small and medium-sized 
entities and emerging economies’ (IASCF, 2005, para. 2(c)).  
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Pacter, long known as ‘Mr Fix’ for his abilities with ‘politically contentious’ 
accounting standard setting projects and appointed him Director of the SME Project 
(Christodoulou, 2010, p.15). In this role, Pacter reported directly to Tweedie, an 
arrangement that shielded him from internal opponents to the project: 
Paul Pacter was appointed, not as a normal member of staff, he directly reports 
to David Tweedie because a normal member of staff would go through the 
technical director and so on and David did not want Paul Pacter to be side-
tracked onto other duties or to have barriers put in his way. So Paul just reports 
directly to David without the normal mechanisms, to protect Paul from other 
board members as it were and from the technical staff. (Interview with Nobes). 
 
I had internal opposition but I must say David Tweedie, chairman, [and] Tom 
Jones as vice chairman have been the two strongest supporters of this project 
throughout. (Interview with Pacter). 
Tweedie described the benefits of this arrangement in different terms: 
The old IASC only had about six staff. I mean, they had very, very small staff 
and I think it was just a question they got bulldozed over by different priorities 
really. It was as simple as that. We were lucky. We got Paul Pacter, who’s been 
doing the whole thing from start to finish and he’s great and he writes very 
quickly, he’s a clear thinker. If he hadn’t done it, I think we’d be about a year or 
two behind, to be honest, because it’s difficult to put staff onto something that’s 
as specialised as that, especially if some of them can only stay two or three years 
and move on. That always causes a problem. (Interview with Tweedie). 
The IASB’s financial and staffing resources were known to be stretched, and it 
was still developing its approach to resourcing (see Camfferman and Zeff, 2015, 
Ch11). One interviewee suggested Pacter’s recruitment had been facilitated by 
dedicated project-specific funding that the UN and World Bank may have helped 
arrange (interview with Fleming). Other interviewees denied that. Commenting on the 
World Bank, for example, interviewees referred to its support as ‘words of 
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encouragement’ (interviews with Garnett, Jones, Leisenring, Seidenstein, Tweedie), 
and its financial support as ‘in general, not for this project’ (interview with Pacter). 
Tweedie acknowledged the IASB received ‘money in general’ from the World Bank 
but was unaware of ‘anything specifically earmarked’ and did not think the World 
Bank or any financial institution provided any financial support for the SME project, 
referring the question to Tom Seidenstein, the Director of Operations (interview with 
Tweedie). Seidenstein, who also referred to support as provided on a general basis, 
denied any ‘specific project support or budgets’ (interview with Seidenstein). 
International Financial Reporting Standard for Small and Medium Enterprises 
was shown on the IASB’s standard setting agenda from July 2003. It had clearly been 
transferred to its active agenda by this time, but it is not clear if a formal vote was 
taken.  Normally entry onto the standard setting agenda requires a simple majority 
vote by the board: 
[For] every other project that I know, there is a formal vote taken at a board 
meeting and the … IASB Update newsletter says the board voted to add this 
project to the agenda. ... On this SME project I have never found an IASB update 
where they voted to add this to the agenda. They just started discussing it. … 
They sort of inherited the project from the old board. It was already partly done 
but to my knowledge I’m not aware of an actual vote where they went around the 
table and raised add this to the agenda or no. (Interview with Pacter). 
Review of both the IASB’s Updates and the IStaR reports that would normally 
note the details of any vote confirms there is no record of a decision to add the project 
to the IASB’s standard setting agenda. One board member of the time has commented 
in general terms on Tweedie’s occasional changes to the agenda without consultation 
with board members, and board members’ efforts to restrain that (see Camfferman 
and Zeff, 2015). For this project, however, that there had been significant efforts to 
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achieve board agreement to the project entering the IASB’s standard setting agenda is 
clear, and another board member suggested other reasons for the lack of a recorded 
vote:  
There must have been [a vote] in terms of due process. I would have thought it’s 
much more likely that it was not recorded than that it wasn’t taken. If it wasn’t 
taken it was a slip. There was certainly an informal vote taken because we had 
discussed it. As I say, I can’t remember whether we discussed it initially in an 
administrative meeting or in a formal Board meeting… (Interview with 
Whittington). 
Had there been a vote at a formal board meeting it seems unlikely that neither 
record of that meeting would mention it, but it does seem reasonable that by this time 
there was a tacit understanding and the formal vote was overlooked. Board discussion 
of the project commenced in July 2003, and Pacter attended this board meeting as the 
director of the project. At the time, he reported that the European Union requirement 
for IFRS had brought the issue to a head, and SME was ‘not necessarily the right title’ 
for the project (IStaR, 2003a, p.31). Pacter described the proposed policy solution to 
the meeting as intended ‘to reduce the burden on SME and non-listed companies’, and 
as ‘a single version of IAS-lite’, while chairman Tweedie described it as ‘a subset of 
[the IASB’s] standards and not a second set’ (IStaR, 2003a, pp. 31‒32 (emphasis 
added); IStaR, 2003b, p.37; IStaR, 2003a, p.33; IASB, 2003). Shortly afterwards, 
Pacter also presented the issue in jurisdictional terms as a question of whether the 
IASB should ‘focus its standards towards entities that participate in public capital 
markets? And CEDE responsibility for developing SME GAAP to other(s); [or 
whether it should] set standards for SMEs as well as for entities that participate in 
public capital markets? [And] SEIZE the responsibility’ (World Standard Setters, 
2003, capitalization in original).  
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Subsequent developments: IFRS for SMEs 
It took the IASB six years (from 2003 to 2009) to promulgate its IFRS for SMEs 
which reduced full IFRS largely by reducing required disclosures, but also by making 
some changes to recognition and measurement requirements. Clearly, at the time of 
agenda entrance, the intentions for the standard went beyond SMEs and the IASB 
devised application criteria that relate to entities considered not publicly accountable, 
according to the IASB’s interpretation of that term. 13  
Most of the criteria didn’t travel well between countries, or industries for that 
matter. …so we had to resort to the principle, and … it’s based on the users of 
the accounts, ... ultimately the accounts have to satisfy users. We can’t allow 
people to simplify them if they don’t meet the needs of the user... Then we 
thought, of course, what about banks? You should have privately owned banks, 
but you will still have depositors who have an interest so the public has an 
interest. So we hit on the idea of publicly accountable to sort of cover that idea, 
it’s the constituency that matters … the people who are outside the company who 
don’t have access to other sources of information. They’re the people being 
served and if there are a lot of those people you don’t want over-simplified 
accounts... (Interview with Whittington). 
 
The size of something seems to me to be pretty irrelevant. … the nature of the 
users of the financial statements is much more important. (Interview with 
Nobes).  
Consequently, although the standard is described as ‘intended for use’ by 
SMEs, it applies to those entities that do not meet the IASB’s interpretation of public 
accountability which does not refer to size. ISAR’s tier 2 SMEGA guidelines for non-
                                                 
13 The application criteria of the standard define an SME as an entity that does not have 
‘public accountability’, and interpret entities with public accountability as ‘those with 
debt or equity instruments [that] are traded in a public capital market’ or as ‘hold[ing] 
assets in a fiduciary capacity for a broad group of outsiders as one of its primary 
businesses’ (IASB, 2009, para 1.3). 
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listed business enterprises seemed to provide an initial model, but whereas SMEGA 
excludes those entities in which there is significant public interest, the IASB’s 
standard does not exclude such enterprises from applying the standard.14 The IASB 
also allows the subsidiaries of listed companies (consolidated groups) and even the 
parent entity to apply it in their own financial reports, provided they are not 
themselves publicly accountable (IASB 2009; IASB, 2015a). Countries adopting this 
standard may add size criteria but, in the absence of additional criteria, the standard 
could feasibly be applied by ‘large but unlisted multinational enterprises’ 
(Camfferman and Zeff, 2015, p.388).   
As the IFRS for SMEs standard neared completion in late 2008, interviewees 
described it as providing ‘a path towards the full standards’: ‘if you want to grow into 
IFRS, it’s easier to have a set that’s based on IFRS rather than something completely 
fresh’ (interviews with Jones and Tweedie). The forthcoming standard would meet 
‘the demand for a simplified version of international standards’ (interview with 
Whittington), some referring to it as small GAAP or IFRS-lite (interviews with 
Pacter, Seidenstein, and Sullivan). It would also be applicable to private entities 
(interview with Walton), and ‘the subsidiaries of [EU listed] companies’ (interview 
with Garnett). However, there remained concerns about its suitability for SMEs 
(interview with Whittington), and about whether this standard that would have the 
IASB’s ‘hexagon on it and … be an authoritative pronouncement signed off by the 
                                                 
14 The SMEGA guidelines refer to ‘significant business enterprises’ in which there is no 
‘public interest’ but do not elaborate on either of these terms (UNCTAD, 2004). The 
IASB considered using both economic significance and public interest as criteria for 
application in the SME standard but subsequently dropped both, leaving only its narrow 
definition of public accountability. 
   
32 
board... will be used inappropriately [including] … by entities that shouldn’t be using 
it’ (interview with Fleming).  
Even at the time of agenda entrance, the SME project title was known to be 
inappropriate, and its intended scope was wider than implied by the title (IASCF, 
2002, IStaR, 2003a). During the course of the project, the IASB tried several times to 
change the title to one that better reflected the nature of the project, first to ‘IFRS for 
non-publicly accountable entities’ (twice, in 2004 and briefly in 2008) and then to 
‘IFRS for private entities’ (2008) (IStaR, 2003a; IASB, 2005; IStaR, 2008; IStaR, 
2009a,b,c). Each attempt was controversial, and resulted in reversion to ‘IFRS for 
SMEs’:  
Almost throughout the whole project … we defined the companies we are 
aiming at the same way. We have said it’s an entity that’s not publicly 
accountable and if either you’re listed or you’re a financial institution you are 
publicly accountable … So the board ... went to non-publicly accountable for a 
while and then people wrote back and [objected] ... and then on top of that the 
trustees changed the constitution to say SME. … So we used SME … in the 
exposure [draft] and [people objected to that]. So I said we’re aiming at anybody 
that’s not public so it’s private. … [people objected]. … We’ve said to the board 
just tell us what you want us to do. We’ve come up with another approach which 
is don’t define it by the type of company but rather the type of standard. So one 
possibility is called Simplified IFRS. (Interview with Pacter). 
 
We’ve probably got to use terms carefully. Simplified would be one way of 
describing it. But there’s a lot of concern among some of my colleagues that we 
didn’t produce what we referred to in shorthand as IFRS lite. … SMEs came out 
first of all because that was the population that … is not addressed by the global 
capital markets. … We were deliberating the scope and wondering how to 
describe the entities for which the standard was intended. … the top level all 
contains publicly accountable entities. Therefore the other group must be the 
non-publicly accountable entities. (Interview with Garnett). 
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The issue of the name aroused very, very strong opinions. We always called it 
the SME project. I like that title. … The reason the people who don’t like it 
apparently oppose it is obscure. … But they say since we refuse to define what is 
a small company and what is a medium company, we can’t call it  a Small 
Medium standard. … quite a lot of the board like SME but the ones who don’t 
really have a strong objection for that kind of semi-legalistic reason. … I don’t 
like any of the [other titles] we have had so far. (Interview with Jones). 
 
I have no idea why we keep changing the title. … most of it goes back to a 
fundamental misunderstanding that we are dictating who the standards apply to 
and we’re not. … I just said I don’t care what the title is. … I suggested Inferior 
IFRS as the title but that didn’t win very many votes. (Interview with 
Leisenring).  
 
Non-publicly accountable entities … was such a mouthful … Small and medium, 
some thought it was all for medium and not for small. Private has got different 
meanings in different countries, it was discovered. … We were even thinking, 
now remember you shouldn’t try and describe the company and just say this is 
Simplified IFRS … it’s very easy to say what it is, which is a cut down version 
of IFRS and we’ve got to find a snappy title that says that. That’s one of the 
alternatives, or we just give up and say it’s SMEs. … People wouldn’t like 
[Simplified IFRS] because it’s demeaning you know, you’d have to find some 
other fancy title. … it doesn’t matter what we choose, it will be wrong, but 
they’ll know what it is. (Interview with Tweedie). 
The fact remained then, and remains today, that the ‘IFRS for SMEs’ title 
misrepresents the nature of the standard and, although the idea of calling it Simplified 
IFRS was never tested publicly, the IASB has since been describing the standard as 
‘good financial reporting made simple’ (IASB, 2015b). In the recent post-
implementation review of the standard, however, changing the title seemed not to be 
contemplated despite the IASB’s description of it.15  
                                                 
15 By the time the review commenced, the IASCF trustees had removed from the constitution 
any specific reference to SMEs, replacing it with a more flexible reference to ‘a range of 
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The SME project that entered the IASB’s standard setting agenda in 2003 
seemed anomalous because the IASB’s jurisdiction at the time related to the world’s 
capital markets and a single set of accounting standards. Agenda setting is perhaps 
‘the single most important decision of an accounting standard setting board’ 
(Howieson, 2009, p.579, citing Beresford). Kingdon’s (2011) model of agenda setting 
is well suited to identifying the multiple, interacting factors underpinning agenda 
entrance. Drawing especially on interviews and other materials this case study of the 
SME project contributes several insights about the complexity of accounting standard 
setting at the international level, and about agenda entrance.  
Importantly, the SME project reveals developments in international 
accounting standard setting that are of greater consequence than the innocuous IFRS 
for SMEs title of the standard suggests. From the time of its establishment in 2001, the 
IASB knew it would be unrealistic to expect ‘across the board’ compliance with the 
more stringent international standards promulgated to gain IOSCO approval in 
international financial markets. The tensions in the lesser developed countries that had 
adopted the international standards, often influenced by the World Bank, were well 
known, and similar tensions were likely in newly adopting countries, including the 
EU countries. Limiting the IASB’s jurisdiction to those entities with debt or equity 
instruments traded in public capital markets (as preferred by board members opposed 
to the SME project) meant ignoring a range of other entities, which include but are not 
limited to SMEs. In number at least, those other entities far exceed those that do issue 
                                                 
size and types of entities in diverse economic settings’ (IFRS Foundation 2010, (para 
2(c)), and Pacter (2011), who initially chaired the review, reported that the standard 
applies to ‘millions of companies (over 99%)!’, citing as evidence non-listed companies, 
rather than SMEs. 
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such publicly-traded instruments. Changing the IASB’s jurisdiction to facilitate 
agenda entrance for the SME project allows the IASB to consider the whole range of 
those other entities. 
Kingdon emphasised the importance of language and careful treatment of 
controversial matters, a point also noted by other accounting standard setting 
researchers. Evidently, the problem as formulated for SMEs fitted the mood of the 
time, even though the problem went beyond SMEs and the policy solution attached to 
it and developed subsequently was not consistent with the problem for SMEs alone. 
Interviewees, both opponents and supporters of the SME project, confirmed the 
project was always going to produce simplified, or ‘cut down IFRS.’ But in the 
context of the IASB’s efforts to require full compliance with its standards, language 
sensitivities meant the IASB could not agree on a ‘snappy title’ to capture the nature 
of the SME project or the eventual standard. As became apparent from the 
controversies surrounding attempts to change the title, the language used in private 
could not be used in public. The IFRS for SMEs title may have helped to blunt 
opposition and blur the divisions within the IASB over a project to produce a 
simplified version of its standards, but it also avoided attracting outside attention to 
the nature and wider implications of the project.  
This presents potential problems for practitioners and academics, and indicates 
further research questions in this more complex international environment. Some may 
be deceived by the IFRS for SMEs title, and overlook the standard’s broad application 
criteria. Others, aware of the broad application criteria may apply the standard to 
‘entities that shouldn’t be using it’, such as ‘large but unlisted multinational 
enterprises’ (interview with Fleming; Camfferman and Zeff (2015, p.388). There is 
scope for research to understand the nature of further limiting criteria, if any, imposed 
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in jurisdictions adopting this standard, and to identify the size and nature of entities 
applying the standard in those jurisdictions. Some jurisdictions have not adopted the 
IFRS for SMEs standard, Australia and Canada representing just two of the non-
adopters. Other research might include international comparisons of the alternative 
regimes. It should be noted that accounting requirements for SMEs are again 
becoming the focus of research attention (see for example, ICAEW, 2015).   
Kingdon emphasises the importance of multiple factors, rather than a single 
factor for achieving agenda entrance. There was considerable external support for the 
SME project to proceed but in the context of IASB efforts to require full compliance 
with its standards, there remained significant within-IASB opposition, and opponents 
maintained that the wording of the IASB’s constitution should prevent agenda 
entrance. The IASCF trustees, however, signalled support for the IASB’s standards to 
accommodate a broader range of entities than capital market participants in countries 
with highly developed capital markets.  
Jurisdictional competition tends to provide only a reinforcing, rather than 
determinative, influence on agenda entrance, but Kingdon observed how rapid agenda 
entrance may be when there is such competition. Agenda entrance for the SME 
project coincided with the issue of ISAR’s SMEGA guidelines, and seemed rushed, 
the formal vote to record the decision possibly being overlooked. There is little to 
suggest ISAR represented a serious jurisdictional threat to the IASB. The IASB had 
observer status at ISAR’s meetings and this should have been known. Walker and 
Robinson (1994) recommended research attention to interactions between regulatory 
agencies. Although such interactions were not the central focus of this study, the SME 
project does show how a sense of jurisdictional competition grew as ISAR pursued its 
project containing policy solution features the IASB itself had proposed, while also 
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urging the IASB and others to act. The impression of jurisdictional competition may 
have involved an element of bluffing rather than actual competition. ISAR’s 
promulgation of SMEGA in mid-2003, together with suggestions that multiple 
versions of simplified IFRS might emerge, helped to build a sense of urgency for the 
IASB to admit the project to its standard setting agenda. In the more complex 
international accounting standard setting environment of today, the nature and extent 
of interactions between regulatory agencies, including those that may seem to be 
competing, and alliance partners, will be a worthy topic of future research attention.  
Walker and Robinson (1994), and Howieson (2009) called for research 
attention to the roles of board and staff in accounting standard setting. Commenting in 
general terms on the roles of visible, as opposed to relatively invisible participants in 
agenda setting, Kingdon (2011) drew particular attention to the distribution of power 
and resources between the more visible internal participants holding high level 
appointments, and the less visible staff and researchers. Whereas the former have 
considerable power over agenda entrance decisions, staff and researchers hold 
relatively greater power over the form of any final policy response. Policy 
entrepreneurs who hold decision making power in addition to their political influence 
and negotiating skills are especially powerful. The within-IASB opposition to the 
SME project centred on the IASB’s constitutional mandate that some members argued 
meant the project was outside the IASB’s jurisdiction. Using the influence, authority 
and resources at their disposal, the IASB’s chairman and vice chairman liaised with 
the IASCF trustees before the IASCF’s review of the constitution commenced, and 
obtained agreement to an extension of the board’s jurisdiction to encompass SMEs. 
Although the initial consultation process for the IASB’s first constitutional review did 
not commence until late 2003, after the SME project was clearly on the IASB’s 
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standard setting agenda, knowledge that the constitution review would change the 
IASB’s jurisdiction was sufficient for agenda entrance to proceed in mid-2003. As 
shown here, powerful board members can, and at times do, exert considerable 
influence behind the scenes.  
The difference in power and resources is also demonstrated here with the 
chairman’s interception of a staff recommendation to the board that the IASB not 
admit the SME project to its standard-setting agenda, followed by the developments 
that ensured it was on the agenda shortly afterwards. The chairman’s ‘presidential’ 
power included the power to appoint staff, thus extending beyond merely setting the 
tone for the project. The recruitment of Pacter from outside the IASB even before the 
project had achieved agenda entrance (evidently involving additional resources), and 
establishment of a special reporting structure directly to the chairman, thus avoiding 
the usual reporting structure for standard setting projects demonstrated the chairman’s 
ability to also influence the form of the final policy response. The IASB’s chairman 
no longer carries the dual role of chairman and chief executive, and more recent 
appointments to the IASB have been less technically oriented than Tweedie 
(Whittington, 2015). While this implies the IASB’s chairman today no longer holds 
such concentrated power, future research might further examine the relative roles of 
board and staff members, remaining alert to interactions between them. 
The case of the IFRS for SMEs project reinforces the point that political 
activities are inherent to accounting standard setting, and that an understanding of 
agenda entrance is critical to understanding the accounting standard setting process. 
The IASB’s constitution and the criteria now specified for agenda entrance project an 
image of accounting standard setting as largely a technical activity, with the IASB’s 
jurisdiction and ability to place items on its agenda limited by these features of 
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ostensibly rational decision making. At the time of agenda entrance, the IASB had no 
published criteria to guide its agenda entrance decisions, thus raising the question 
whether such criteria might have prevented the SME project from achieving agenda 
entrance. The IASB’s most recent explanation of how it sets the agenda which 
included published criteria suggests not (http://www.ifrs.org/How-we-develop-
standards/Pages/Setting-the-agenda.aspx, downloaded 21 November 2016). There is 
no indication of how the various criteria (relevance to users; existing guidance; 
possibility of increased convergence; quality of standard to be developed; and 
resource constraints) inter-relate or may be balanced off against each other. Had such 
criteria existed in 2003 it seems unlikely the outcome of the IASB’s agenda entrance 
decision would have been different. At the time, the constitutional wording of the 
IASB’s jurisdiction presented a stronger barrier to agenda entrance than the agenda 
entrance criteria now published, and this study has shown how even this obstacle 
could be overcome by those with the power and influence to do so. The formal agenda 
entrance process may contain features of rational decision-making but, as shown in 
this case study, these barely conceal the politics and decision-making complexity of 
the agenda entrance decision (Kingdon, 2011). 
According to Sir David Tweedie, without a formal extension of its 
jurisdiction, the IASB risked public criticism that the SME project was outside its 
jurisdiction. He expected the IASB’s jurisdiction to ‘change to encompass whatever 
the trustees think the board should deal with’, thus implying the statement of the 
IASB’s jurisdiction (and, by extension, any agenda entrance criteria) should be 
flexible. Since this agenda entrance decision, the wording of the IASB’s constitution 
has changed from a level of specificity about its jurisdiction that threatened to bar 
agenda entrance for the SME project to such vagueness today that it seems unlikely to 
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limit the IASB’s continued adaptation to the changing international accounting 
standard setting environment. The current reference in the constitution to ‘a range of 
sizes and types of entities in diverse economic settings’ may now support ‘more wide-
ranging’ IASB ambitions, potentially including international jurisdiction over both 
public sector and not-for-profit financial reporting (IFRS Foundation, 2010, para 2(c); 
2012, p.13; Botzem, 2012; interview with Tweedie). Such possibilities promise a rich 
seam of future research into the IASB’s standard setting activities. 
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